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APPRENDI/BOOKER AND ANEMIC APPELLATE
REVIEW *
NANCY GERTNER **
The Supreme Court’s case law following Apprendi v. New Jersey and United
States v. Booker, and the decisional law of the federal appellate courts, have
had unintended and less than salutary results. While the appellate courts were
uniquely suited to offer a meaningful critique of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) as well as substantive guidance about what nonGuidelines sentencing might involve, they have largely abdicated those roles.
Judicial critiques of the Guidelines could have made the U.S. Sentencing
Commission more accountable and could have imposed the kind of review that
other agency rules and criminal statutes receive by requiring that the Guidelines
be aligned with the purpose of sentencing and based on studies and data. But
since the appellate law requires nothing more than that the district courts
compute the Guidelines correctly, there is no incentive to critique them. Nor
have appellate courts provided any substantive guidance concerning what nonGuidelines sentencing should involve or what principles should inform nonGuidelines sentences. The result is that interpretation of the Guidelines has
stalled, on the one hand, and the substantive law of sentencing is chaotic, on the
other.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Apprendi v. New Jersey and United States v. Booker 2 were watershed
opinions without watershed results. Beginning with Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the Constitution required what appeared to be a new role for
the twentieth-century jury—namely, a role in sentencing. Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, held that the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that any fact (other than a prior
conviction) which increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be found by
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a judge by a preponderance of
the evidence. 3
A year later, in Booker, the Court concluded that the facts a jury had to
decide under the Sixth Amendment now included those that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) made relevant. 4 Since the core
constitutional violation in Booker was that judges, not juries, were finding
sentencing facts with determinative sentencing consequences fixed by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), the cure, according to Justice Breyer,
was to make the Guidelines advisory. 5 While that result was heralded by district
court judges, like me, who chafed under the Guidelines, it has not led to
meaningful change in a deeply, deeply flawed federal sentencing system. 6
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
4. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
5. Id. at 245. In a mandatory guidelines regime, what the judges did at sentencing looked exactly
like what juries do—finding facts with determinate consequences, thereby usurping the jury’s role
according to the Booker majority. Id. at 243–44. Indeterminate sentencing had not raised constitutional
alarms, although it had other problems. Juries found facts subject to strict procedural rules; conversely,
judges had a flexible role in individualized sentencing, with more lenient rules and lower standards.
Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 165 (2007). See generally Nancy
Gertner, Juries and Originalism: Giving “Intelligible Content” to the Right to a Jury Trial, 71 OHIO ST. L.J.
935, 937–38 (2010) (discussing the jury’s historical role in sentencing and arguing that the jury’s key
role in determining sentences for crimes subject to mandatory minimums should require courts to give
juries at least a cursory explanation of possible punishments).
6. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 901, 908 (1991) (providing a general critique of the Guidelines); Nancy Gertner, Against
These Guidelines, 87 UMKC L. REV. 49, 51–52 (2018) [hereinafter Gertner, Against These Guidelines]
(same). The Guidelines elevated the avoidance of sentencing disparity over all other purposes, like
justice, fairness, and proportionality. And to accomplish this purpose, the Commission keyed
sentencing to ostensibly objective factors like drug quantity, the amount of the fraud, or the offender’s
criminal record, without meaningful consideration of what that quantity reflected (such as dealing
drugs to get school supplies) or the racial bias that criminal records masked (such as “driving while
Black” or over-policing in communities of color). Pre-Guidelines factors like mens rea, mental illness,
trauma, and even drug or alcohol addiction were largely left out of the analysis. Important drivers of
offending were ignored, creating a false uniformity in which unlike offenders were treated alike. The
differential treatment between defendants charged with crack-cocaine sales (disproportionately Black)
and defendants charged with cocaine sales (disproportionately White) was exacerbated. Finally, the
Guidelines led to higher and higher sentences for these offenses, dramatically increasing mass
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Booker and Apprendi created space for judicial discretion in the application
of the Guidelines, altogether a good first step in my judgment. The critical
question was what the next steps would be. Judicial discretion could have
informed the development of sentencing in two respects. First, it could have
provided a critique of the Guidelines, subjecting them to the kind of review that
other agency rules and other criminal statutes receive. And by critiquing the
Guidelines, courts could have made the Commission more accountable, forcing
the Guidelines it promulgated to be more consistent with the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) 7 and more aligned with the purposes of sentencing
than they have ever been.
That is what I tried to do while I was on the bench in the years before
Booker and especially after. I wrote opinions that critically evaluated the
Guidelines: Since only “extraordinary family circumstances” would qualify for
a departure from the Guidelines—and a reduced sentence—it seemed important
to critically analyze the term. 8 What does “extraordinary family circumstances”
mean after all? 9 What did the Guidelines’ drafters see as the benchmark
incarceration for all offenders and especially for people of color. Until 2014, the Commission used
mandatory sentences as the base levels for the Guidelines, pushing sentences even higher than the
Congressional minimums. Although the Guidelines are advisory now, they continue to exert an
outsized influence on sentencing outcomes. Mass incarceration and racial disparities continue virtually
unabated. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra, at 52–55. Notably, no other state or country has
adopted the Guidelines model. Indeed, even the American Law Institute’s revision of the Model Penal
Code on Sentencing expressly rejected the Guidelines model because it failed to provide adequate room
for judicial sentencing discretion. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 6B.06 cmt. a (AM. L. INST.,
Proposed Final Draft 2017) (“Under the revised Code, the commission has no power to forbid or
require the consideration of any sentencing factor.”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G REP. 115–25
(AM. L. INST. 2003). Other critiques of the Guidelines include that the Guidelines treat in like manner
offenders who are not at all alike, do not reflect in any coherent way the purposes of sentencing; ignore
salient factors that could impact culpability; and finally, lead to extraordinarily harsh sentences without
regard to proportionality. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104 (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing
the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 836
(1992).
7. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
28 U.S.C.).
8. The Guidelines indicated that a departure for family circumstances was not “ordinarily
relevant” but never defined what that the “ordinary family” was; there were no commentaries, no
application notes, no examples, no findings, not even a rationale offered by the Commission. U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). As Judge Jack Weinstein
noted, “Given the multiplicity of family arrangements in New York City, the use of the term ‘ordinary’
in the Guidelines gives the judge little guidance.” Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women,
Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 177–78 (1996). I tried to define
the term and understand its relationship to the sentencing structure. I had to. I was sentencing
individuals. See, e.g., United States v. LaCarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2002); United
States v. Thompson, 74 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 1999), vacated, 234 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2000).
9. Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines listed offender characteristics which were “not ordinarily
relevant” to whether a sentence should be outside the Guidelines range, including “family ties and
responsibilities.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6; see also United States v. Pereira, 272

99 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2021)

1372

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-5

“ordinary” family? On what data was this factor based? The Guidelines made
distinctions between minimal and minor participants in a crime (different
reductions in the Guidelines points for each), essentially picking numbers out
of the air, largely without explanation. 10 Why were the reductions for mitigating
roles set where they were? One finding which could lead to an increase in the
Guidelines score was that someone was an organizer or leader of an “extensive
organization.” What does “extensive organization” 11 mean, and where did this
concept come from? In my view, the Guidelines were incoherent, offering the
illusion of rationality and a thoughtful arithmetic exercise while actually
providing “back of the envelope” calculations. 12 I was not alone in these
observations. 13
Second, increased judicial discretion post-Booker could have effected
meaningful change in sentencing by creating a common law of sentencing: 14 a
judge-made sentencing framework supplementing, and perhaps supplanting,
the Guidelines. Such a framework would go beyond my prior critiques, which
amounted to describing what not to do, noting that this or that guideline was
without basis or ambiguous. It would also outline what to do: namely, how to
consider issues that the Guidelines had trivialized or excluded from the
sentencing calculus, like mental health; neuroscientific insights into addiction
F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2001) (excluding parental care from “extraordinary circumstances” for Guidelines
departures); LaCarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (“[C]ourt[s] must measure the defendant against all
other defendants, no matter the crime of his or her conviction, and determine whether he or she is
‘irreplaceable.’”); Thompson, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 75–76 (defining extraordinary circumstances flexibly to
reflect judges’ own past experiences as well as other cases of similarly situated offenders).
10. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2; see United States v. Cabrera, 567 F. Supp. 2d
271, 277 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating that the Guidelines do not define “minimal” or “minor” and that the
number of “points” seems “wholly arbitrary”); United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246,
254 (D. Mass. 2004) (reducing the Guidelines role adjustment for a woman who was used as a drug
mule).
11. The government could seek an increase in the Guidelines range—which means a higher
sentence—if a defendant was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a); see United
States v. Footman, 66 F. Supp. 2d 83, 92–94 (D. Mass. 1999) (interpreting the meanings of
“participant” and “otherwise extensive”); see also Panel III: Accomplishing the Purposes of Sentencing—The
Role of Courts and the Commission, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 179, 179 (2003).
12. For a similar critique of the Guidelines’ false rationality, see Michael Tonry, The Questionable
Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT
SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 91, 92 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von
Hirsch eds., 2010).
13. Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 11, 17–18 (2003) (arguing that the Guidelines were flawed and suggesting that a common law of
sentencing would produce fairer results).
14. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and
Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 94 (1999) (arguing that a common law of
departures could eventually emerge from appellate review of reasoned departures); Marc Miller,
Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (1992) (criticizing the Commission for failing
to articulate a sentencing philosophy).
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or childhood adversity; or the advancement of sentencing theories, such as
principles of proportionality, that the Guidelines’ drafters ignored.
Neither alternative happened. Rather, post-Booker sentencing is what
Professor Paul Hofer, former Senior Research Associate for the Commission,
has described as a chaotic, “tragic mess.” 15
This Article examines the problems with post-Booker sentencing,
specifically keying in on the role of the federal appellate courts. While they
were uniquely suited to offer both a meaningful critique of the Guidelines as
well as substantive guidance about what non-Guidelines sentencing might
involve, they have largely abdicated those roles. Part I briefly explains the
shortcomings of the Guidelines today. Part II addresses how institutional actors
like district courts and Congress have exacerbated these shortcomings. Part III
builds on my prior work by explaining the role of the appellate courts in our
current state of post-Booker Guidelines confusion.
I. THE STATE OF SENTENCING TODAY
If there ever was a moment for judges to critique the Guidelines, the years
after Booker were it. 16 If there ever was a moment for the emergence of a robust
body of law that evaluated the Guidelines, 17 the statutory purposes behind
them, the basis for their promulgation, and whether that record was adequate
or inadequate, the years after Booker were it. 18 But that revolution did not
15. Paul Hofer, After Ten Years of Advisory Guidelines, and Thirty Years of Mandatory Minimums,
Federal Sentencing Still Needs Reform, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 649, 649 (2016) [hereinafter Hofer, After Ten
Years].
16. This was the kind of judicial input that some of the individuals who had participated in the
Guidelines movement envisioned. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1694 (1992) (arguing that Congress
envisioned a more interactive process for Guidelines development involving the Commission, judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys).
17. For examples of cases in which this kind of analysis did take place, see United States v.
Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259, 271 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court can justify a sentence below
the Guidelines’ sentencing ranges by citing disagreement with the Guidelines’ policy); United States
v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a district court may choose a sentence outside
of the Guidelines if the Guidelines range is too high or too low to accomplish the purposes of
punishment); United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding that the
Guidelines overemphasized the quantity of drugs possessed by the offender and underemphasized the
offender’s minor role in the drug distribution organization); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d
382, 412 (D.N.J. 2008) (holding that the Guidelines range was inapplicable in a case involving child
pornography); United States v. Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d 228, 238 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that the
Guidelines’ career-offender provisions inadequately addressed the purposes of punishment).
18. Even the Booker promise of administrative procedural review of the Guidelines—wherein the
Guidelines are stripped of the force of law, and the Commission is transformed into a more traditional
administrative agency subject to review akin to that required by the Administrative Procedure Act,
Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.)—was
largely unfulfilled. See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a
Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 217 (2005).
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happen. Ironically, this lack of action was the product of the Supreme Court’s
efforts to structure sentencing in a two-step process post-Booker. Under this
process, step one involved calculating the Guidelines range and identifying any
departures that were specifically addressed in the Guidelines book. 19 Step two
involved looking at the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 20 such as the need for the
sentence to “promote respect for the law,” “to protect the public,” and “to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities.” 21 Then, and only then, could the judge
decide whether to vary from the Guidelines range. 22
In short order, it was clear that a sure-fire way to get reversed by the courts
of appeals—even in the enlightened post-Booker world—was to incorrectly
calculate the Guidelines in step one. As a result, most district court judges—
even those who were dissatisfied with the Guidelines computation—took no
chances. Better to vary from the Guidelines under Booker at step two than to
try to carve out new interpretations for departures from the Guidelines at step
one. Indeed, the path of least resistance for judges would be to take the most
crabbed, even discretion-limiting view of the Guidelines’ provisions possible at
step one (usually the government’s position) and proceed directly to a step-two
variance, where judges may take many more factors into account with less
rigorous appellate review. 23
There are parallels here with the evolution of qualified immunity
decisional law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After the Supreme Court held in Pearson
v. Callahan 24 that courts resolving government officials’ qualified immunity
claims do not have to decide whether the plaintiff’s facts make out a violation
of constitutional right (the merits prong) before asking whether the right was
“clearly established” (the immunity prong), 25 many courts simply stopped
articulating the metes and bounds of § 1983 violations. 26 The result was what
19. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range[;] . . . the Guidelines should be
the starting point and the initial benchmark.”).
20. Id. at 49–50.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(6).
22. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50.
23. See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714–15 (2008) (citation omitted) (“Although the
Guidelines, as the ‘starting point and the initial benchmark,’ continue to play a role in the sentencing
determination . . . there is no longer a limit . . . on the variances from Guidelines ranges that a district
court may find justified under the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).”).
24. 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (affirming
Pearson’s procedure and noting that deciding qualified immunity issues on the basis of the right not
being “clearly established” by prior case law “comports with our usual reluctance to decide
constitutional questions unnecessarily”).
25. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
26. See, e.g., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015) (declining to
decide a constitutional question and concluding only that the officer’s “failure to accommodate” mental
illness during an arrest did not “violate[] clearly established law”). Christensen v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009), involved a visual artist who attempted to display and sell his

99 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2021)

2021]

APPRENDI AND ANEMIC APPELLATE REVIEW

1375

two scholars described as “constitutional stagnation”: “Because many
constitutional issues arise in cases subject to qualified immunity, if courts were
simply to resolve such claims on the ground that there is no clearly established
right, then the constitutional rights may never be clearly established—especially
when new fact patterns and technologies are at issue.” 27
Likewise, few post-Booker courts were reexamining the contrived
Guidelines rules themselves in any depth; they could compute them in as
straightforward a manner as possible and vary if they did not like the result.
Why bother to challenge what “extraordinary family circumstances” meant after
all, or the Talmudic distinctions between minor or minimal participants, or take
issue with the Guidelines’ failure to consider addiction, when you could go
directly to the sentence you wanted to impose—as a variance.
The second problem is that when judges chose to vary in the second stage
of the analysis, few theorized about what they were doing and where their
decision fit in a rational sentencing policy; they did not have to. Neither 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) nor the Supreme Court gave them much guidance. Judges had
discretion. They could consider non-Guidelines factors and weigh them as they
saw fit. Their decisions would be reviewed for “reasonableness” under an “abuse
of discretion” standard, the most lenient appellate test. 28
But giving judges more discretion says nothing about how they should
exercise it—based on what principles, under what theory, and with what

artwork on public property. He was arrested for violating a city ordinance; the charges were eventually
dropped. Christensen sued claiming a violation of the First Amendment. The Tenth Circuit declined
to decide whether the artwork in question was protected by the First Amendment, determining instead
that the right, whatever it was, was not clearly established. Id. at 1277; see also infra notes 90–91 and
accompanying text.
27. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 4 (2015). Professors Aaron Nielson and Christopher Walker performed a statistical review of the
post-Pearson cases, concluding that: first, there is some empirical foundation for the concerns about
constitutional stagnation; second, “there is disparity among [the] circuits regarding whether and how
courts are reaching constitutional questions”; and third, there is an asymmetry in the development of
the doctrine—judges who hold certain substantive views are more likely to decide the constitutional
question than others. Id. at 6–7.
28. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). “Abuse of discretion” review gives the trial
judge the widest latitude in deference to the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to find the
facts, to know the individual defendant, and to make credibility determinations. Carissa Byrne Hessick
& F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008). While
that is surely true, it also leads the appellate court to be overly deferential to the trial court, abdicating
any responsibility to articulate substantive sentencing standards. Professors Carissa Byrne Hessick and
F. Andrew Hessick describe the standard this way: “Abuse of discretion applies to those decisions that
call upon the district court to exercise discretion, such as when the law does not prescribe a rule of
decision other than to direct a court to balance competing interests in rendering judgment.” Id. Under
an abuse of discretion standard, the “appellate court’s task is not to render a decision by reweighing the
competing interests, but only to ensure that the district court’s weighing was permissible.” Id. At the
same time, Professors C. Hessick and A. Hessick note that “reasonableness” review is actually
inconsistent with an “abuse of discretion” standard. Id. at 16–17.
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methodology. “Judicial discretion,” after all, is not a criminal justice policy; it
simply describes who ought to make the decision about sentencing, not what the
decision should be. Small wonder the result was chaotic, the continuation of
Guidelines-speak in some courts or a cacophony of factors, depending upon who
the judge was:
Without a sentencing framework independent of the Guidelines by
which to evaluate them, there is no way of understanding when they
should be rejected or adjusted, what alternatives are appropriate and
available, or what evidence-based practices can inform sentencing.
Without an alternative framework, in short, calling the Guidelines
“advisory” is a ruse. 29
In effect, old habits that predated the Guidelines persisted—habits like not fully
explaining sentences (beyond Guidelines-speak), not meaningfully engaging
with any kind of coherent methodology like proportionality review, 30 not
writing opinions, and not being trained in the exercise of the new discretion. 31
Which sentencing players could have stepped into the breach and provided
that framework and coherence on both fronts—critical Guidelines analysis and
a substantive theory of sentencing? The district courts, courts of appeals, the
Commission, Congress? I have written about why district courts, the
Commission, and surely Congress did not do so. 32 Here, I focus on the appellate
courts. Why have our courts of appeals not been able to provide meaningful
substantive review of sentences when courts of appeals in other common-law

29. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 54–55.
30. Proportionality review, for example, might involve evaluating the gravity of the sentence
relative to the offense, how the sentence compares with penalties for crimes of equal or greater
seriousness within the same jurisdiction, or how the sentence compares with the sanctions imposed for
the same offense in other jurisdictions. It might also entail determining whether the punishment is
inconsistent with an accepted penological goal. See, e.g., Bruce W. Gilchrist, Disproportionality in
Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1979).
31. I have previously argued that the Guidelines fundamentally changed federal judges’
approaches to sentencing. After decades of the Guidelines, federal judges began to behave like expert
clerks in a civil code system:
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been interpreted more like civil code than a statute
in a common law regime: They were viewed as comprehensive; they were the work of
“experts,” and if there were gaps, the experts, notably, the Sentencing Commission, had to fill
them. The Commission would resolve circuit conflicts; the Commission would answer all
questions. The judges were to be clerks, not interpreting the document, which after all, was
essentially perfect, but simply providing sentencing “answers.” The premises were flawed.
Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
523, 534 (2007) [hereinafter Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence]; see also United States v. Jaber, 362 F.
Supp. 2d 365, 371–76 (D. Mass. 2005) (criticizing the premises about the Guidelines that had been
accepted uncritically by the federal bench).
32. See generally Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 31, at 532–35 (describing the myriad
challenges faced by courts and Congress in providing a coherent framework for the Guidelines).
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countries, like Canada or Australia, have? Sentencing history and confusing
Supreme Court guidance provide some—not all—of the answer.
But before I address the appellate courts, I provide a quick review of why
district courts, the Commission, and Congress did not provide meaningful
sentencing guidance, which made the appellate courts’ potential role all the
more significant. 33
II. THE DISTRICT COURTS
The Guidelines reshaped the way that district court judges approached
sentencing so that even when the Guidelines became advisory, most judges still
followed them. Judges credited the Commission with a competence that it did
not have and with work in promulgating the Guidelines that it did not do.
Judges believed the Commission had expertise, had considered all aspects of
sentencing, and that the Guidelines it promulgated were grounded in a careful
empirical analysis—none of which was true. 34 Twenty years of Guidelines
sentencing had desensitized judges to longer and longer sentences. The issue
was not “should this individual go to prison?”; more often, it was, “how much
time?’’ By 2005, when Booker was decided, compliance with the Guidelines was
at an all-time high. 35 To be sure, there were exceptions in judges who criticized
the Guidelines and who regularly departed from the Guidelines, but they were
in the minority. 36

33. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 54–55. As I noted, the fact is that
[t]he Guidelines were not intended to be, and were not in fact, comprehensive. There were
gaps, which the drafters acknowledged. They were not drafted by sentencing experts . . . . The
Commission did not review the efficacy of sentences: Why ten years for one offense, five for
another? . . . To the extent the guidelines were based on “scientific” data, the data was skewed,
and at times, ignored. The Commission simply calculated the average length of sentences . . .
and then increased them. The Guidelines were not even a restatement of existing sentencing
standards. The Commission did not look closely at what factors judges actually used in
calculating sentences. It simply compared gross sentencing outcomes and decided what factors
must have been significant.
Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 31, at 534–35.
34. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 56; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note
6, at 38–39, 110–12 (challenging the expertise of the Guidelines drafters, critiquing the empirical basis
of the Guidelines, and suggesting that rather than being comprehensive, they were at best a rough cut
of what a sentencing system should be).
35. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA
REPORT 10 fig.A (2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YF3R-UQ77]; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING
PROJECT 7 (2006), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/postBooker_052306.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JTCF9U3].
36. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the
Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 79 (2003) (describing the fact
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Booker changed that pattern to a degree but not in a way that would
contribute to a rational national-sentencing policy. It is not an
oversimplification to say that there are two broad categories of district court
judges after Apprendi and Booker: Guidelines judges and non-Guidelines
judges. 37 Guidelines judges recite the mantra, “Yes, I have discretion to depart
or vary from the Guidelines, but no, I never or very rarely do.” In jurisdictions
with crowded dockets (or where there is that perception) and in jurisdictions
that suffered from rigorous Guidelines enforcement before Booker, 38 the
Guidelines are an easy default. 39 Simply “do the numbers,” as the NPR program
on the stock market suggests, and you can be efficient and avoid criticism. 40 Do
the opposite—depart from the Guidelines or vary—and you may have to hold
hearings and explain yourself in written opinions because you are bound to
invite appellate scrutiny. 41 In fact, requiring the judge to compute the numeric
Guidelines in the first instance—as Supreme Court case law directs—

that judges took advantage of the discretion that the Guidelines provided pre-Booker); Kate Stith, The
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1447–48 (2008).
37. In part, this derives from the circuit in which the districts are located. Six circuits have
adopted a “presumption of reasonableness” for within-Guidelines sentences. Compare United States v.
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006) (adopting a presumption of reasonableness for withinGuidelines sentencing), United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006) (same), United
States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (same), United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d
606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (same), United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717–18 (8th Cir. 2005) (same),
and United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (same), with United States v.
Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the presumption of reasonableness while noting
that a within-Guidelines sentence will typically be upheld as reasonable).
38. Hofer, After Ten Years, supra note 15, at 650 (“Booker did not, however, establish the balance
needed in federal sentencing. Mandatory minimums remain in effect and continue to override judicial
discretion, and the guidelines recommendations, in thousands of cases a year. . . . Other guidelines
recommendations reflect congressional directives, or the Commission’s own unsound decisions. The
advisory guidelines exert a gravitational pull even when they recommend sentences far greater than
necessary. Sentencing reform was a good idea, but the federal system has yet to try it.”).
39. In fact, after Booker, the Commission took pains to tout judicial compliance with the
Guidelines. In 2011, the Commission Chair testified to Congress that 80.4% of all federal sentences
from the prior year were “within the applicable advisory guideline range or below the range at the
request of the government,” with 55.0% of all cases falling within the applicable range and 25.4%
receiving a government-sponsored, below-range sentence (although that number includes variances to
which the government agreed). See Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Judge
Patti B. Saris, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressionaltestimony-and-reports/testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6UP-AQJS];
see also Michael Tonry, The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Best Response to Booker Is To Do Nothing, 24
FED. SENT’G REP. 387, 393 (2012). I would suggest that the Commission adjust its focus to judges
who never, or very rarely, depart or vary. Those judges are arguably violating the constitutional
proscriptions of Booker.
40. See Nancy Gertner, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing–Real or Imagined?, 28 FED. SENT’G
REP. 165, 165 (2016).
41. Id. at 165.
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necessarily “anchors” judicial decision-making. 42 And with respect to the nonGuidelines judges, too many exercise their discretion without doing much
beyond listing the § 3553(a) factors, with a perfunctory explanation that passes
muster in most circuits. 43 Worse, these judges will often vary in a way that is
not reproducible by others—without writing an opinion. 44
III. THE COMMISSION
The Commission’s considerable resources post-Booker have too often been
devoted to justifying its own existence, which means monitoring compliance
with the Guidelines to show that the Guidelines still mattered even in cases
when they should not. 45 The Commission’s training modules and reports
highlighting Guidelines compliance remained virtually unchanged. 46 To attend
a Commission sentencing conference, as late as 2017, or to review Commission
training of judges, is to think you are in a time warp, as if Booker and its progeny

42. See Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 31, at 535; see also Mark Bennett, Confronting
Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming
a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 503–13 (2014); Nancy Gertner, What Yogi
Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006) [hereinafter
Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches]; Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 901, 949 (2015).
43. As Professor Hofer notes, “Booker empowered judges to critically evaluate the Guidelines’
recommendations, but many sentencing judges continue to be anchored to the Guidelines’ distorted
starting point, and reluctant to engage in the critical policy analyses needed to evaluate the guidelines’
fairness and effectiveness.” Hofer, After Ten Years, supra note 15, at 693; see also William W. Berry III,
Discretion Without Guidance: The Need To Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN.
L. REV. 631, 664 (2008). The First Circuit made clear that a judge’s reasons for a sentence do not even
have to be explicit—they can be “inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained
in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did.” United States v. Coelho, 212 F. App’x 7, 8 (1st
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc)).
44. See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 270, 278
(2009) (describing continued Guidelines sentencing as the result of “the habits ingrained during twenty
years of mandatory Guideline sentencing” and noting that “after the SRA, judges were trained only in
the Guidelines”); Stith, supra note 36, at 1496–97 (concluding that “the gravitational pull of the
Guidelines on the pendulum of sentencing practice remains strong” based, in part, on the reluctance of
“incumbent sentencing decision makers” who were obliged to follow the Guidelines for two decades).
45. See Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 53; see also J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All
the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH.
L. REV. 693, 725–26 (2011) (“But, curiously, even post-Booker, there has been a great deal of attention
paid to rates of departures and variances. Judges worried that if they took a ‘free at last, free at last’
approach, Congress might respond with a ‘Booker fix’ even more restrictive than the mandatory
Guidelines. So judges monitored sentencing trends closely, as did the Commission and a vigilant
Congress. Even now, the Commission presents its data by comparing post-Booker statistics against preBooker rates of departures, even though pre-Booker Guidelines achieved their compliance rates by
violating the Sixth Amendment.”).
46. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 7–8 (2020) [hereinafter
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE BASICS], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2020/202009_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAA8LM7J].
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never happened. 47 The Commission regularly issues reports—which many have
criticized—suggesting that racial bias has seeped into judicial decision-making
with the Booker regime, as if it were absent before then. 48 Furthermore, the
Commission’s website and training ignore lower court decisions of those judges
who have in fact tried to theorize about sentencing. 49 The Commission does not
showcase meaningful alternatives to incarceration, describe the programs that
are the most efficacious, or encourage judges to consider them. If they did, they
would be encouraging noncompliance with the Guidelines, their raison d’être.
It did not have to be this way. The Commission could have used whatever
expertise it had to conduct studies reflecting (to the extent possible) what works
to deter crime and restore offenders, undo the effects of mass incarceration, and
reduce racial sentencing disparities. And those reasoned studies, and the
proposals for sentencing they would generate, could be used to guide the new
judicial discretion rather than to justify unquestioned Guidelines following. 50
The Commission could become the repository of studies from other credible
sources on recidivism, alternatives to incarceration, and evidence-based
practices; it could gather information about the developing common law of

47. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 54.
48. See Paul J. Hofer, The Commission Defends an Ailing Hypothesis: Does Judicial Discretion Increase
Demographic Disparity?, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 311, 312 (2013) (suggesting that there was disparity,
including racial disparity, pre-Booker); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing
and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 5
(2013) (identifying the role of prosecutors’ charging decisions in racial disparity); U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF
HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF SENTENCING REFORM 113–14 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN
YEARS],
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projectsand-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3WD-ZZ39].
Commission reports also focus only on the Guidelines’ factors; if a judge considers a factor outside of
the Guidelines, such as educational background or post-traumatic stress disorder, that judge’s analysis
is not covered by or included in the Commission studies. Nancy Gertner, Judge Identifiers, TRAC, and
a Perfect World, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 46, 46 (2012).
49. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE BASICS, supra note 46, 28–29 (mentioning departures
and variances without explaining courts’ stated reasons for varying or providing examples); Search
Results: “Gertner”, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/search/site/gertner [https://perma.cc/
42PA-GB5H] (revealing that none of Judge Gertner’s opinions critiquing the Guidelines appear when
searching her name on the Commission’s website).
50. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 50–51.
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sentencing, analyzing the reasons for and results of judges’ departures from the
Guidelines. 51 None of that has happened. 52
IV. CONGRESS
The Booker remedial majority acknowledged that the “ball now lies in
Congress’ court” to create a sentencing system compatible with the
Constitution. 53 Congress, however, dropped the proverbial ball. It refused to
repeal all mandatory minimum sentences, instead making only minor
adjustments to such sentences through bills like the First Step Act. 54 It
approved reductions in the Guidelines ranges proposed during the Obama
Administration, 55 but these reductions—while helpful—were limited. Neither
Congress nor the Commission has considered a more substantial overhaul—a
better-articulated statement of sentencing principles undergirding the
Guidelines, grounding specific Guidelines provisions in administrative findings
of fact and empirical studies, and considering a wide range of evidence-based
sentencing alternatives. Again, history is relevant: Prior to the Guidelines,
Congress reflected a hands-off attitude to sentencing, providing broad
sentencing ranges per offense with virtually no guidance as to how a judge

51. See, e.g., Michael S. Tunink, A New Role for the United States Sentencing Commission in PostBooker Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1429, 1430 (2008) (“[T]he Commission must develop a framework
that establishes a dialogue between the Commission and the judiciary by incorporating departures and
variances as amendments to the Guidelines in an attempt to reflect current judicial sentencing practice.
Second, the Commission should further cultivate judicial compliance by articulating the specific
penological reasons for the existing Guidelines and for each subsequent amendment to the Guidelines.
This will provide the foundation for a collaborative dialogue between the judiciary and the
Commission . . . .”).
52. Compare the work of the Commission with that of the Victoria (Australia) Sentencing
Advisory Council. About Us: Establishment and Functions, SENT’G ADVISORY COUNCIL,
http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/about-us [https://perma.cc/AJ4Z-2U5J]. In 2014, for
example, the Victoria prosecutor who serves as the Director of Public Prosecutions, applied to the
Victoria Court of Appeal for a “guideline judgment.” See Boulton v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 308, 311–
12 (Austl.). This judgment was, in effect, an advisory opinion on the standards for using a community
correction order (similar to a probationary sentence). Id. While the Victoria Sentencing Advisory
Council mainly generates high quality studies on a variety of sentencing issues, in this instance it was
asked to participate in the guideline judgment process by providing its views to the Director of Public
Prosecutions and to the court. Id. The court carefully considered the proposed guideline judgment and
adopted it, both to resolve the cases before the court and to establish a precedent for similar cases. Id.
53. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005).
54. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.); id. § 102, 132 Stat. at 5220–21 (reducing certain enhanced mandatory minimum penalties for
some drug offenders); see also NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT
OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW 8–9 (2019) (describing the limited sentencing reforms enacted under the First
Step Act).
55. See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-220, §§ 5–7, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373–74
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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should sentence within them. 56 With the Guidelines, a switch was flipped, and
Congress took a totally hands-on approach, creating new mandatory minimum
sentences and even directing the Commission—the “expert agency” to which it
had turned to rationalize sentencing—to increase sentencing ranges. 57
V. APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

Before Booker

The history of sentencing appellate review, which I touch on briefly below,
is critical to understanding why the courts of appeals behaved as they did postBooker. Before the implementation of the Guidelines, there was essentially no
appellate review of federal sentencing. 58 As a 1964 note in the Yale Law Journal
stated, “It appears well settled that federal appellate courts will not review a
sentence that is within statutory limits.” 59 The appellate courts even refused “to
disturb an obviously excessive sentence within statutory limits.” 60 Without
meaningful appellate review, lower courts had no incentive to articulate
consistent sentencing standards or theories, laying the groundwork for the
sentencing critique of reformers in the 1970s and 1980s. 61
While other countries’ common-law appellate courts regularly reviewed
sentences of lower courts using the principles of proportionality and developed

56. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law,
or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 696 (2010) (discussing the discretion given to
judges in determining sentences).
57. See, e.g., Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-71, §§ 2–4,
109 Stat. 774, 744 (1995) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994) (directing the Commission to increase the base
offense level for certain sexual offenses against children); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 6454, 102 Stat. 4181, 4372 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994) (directing the Commission
to increase the minimum offense level for drug offenses involving minors). See generally U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 48, at B-1 to -11 (listing the congressional directives given to
the Commission after the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act).
58. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 111 (“Federal appellate courts had no occasion
to develop or expound general principles of sentencing justice.”). The doctrine of nonreviewability of
sentences “prevailed from 1891 until 1987” when the Guidelines were passed. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing
Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1441, 1444 (1997).
59. Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379, 381 (1964).
60. Comment, Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentences, 46 IOWA L. REV. 159, 160 (1960).
61. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973).
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a common law of sentencing, 62 the United States had no such tradition. 63
Indeed, some scholars have suggested there was general hostility to the idea:
Professor Vicki Jackson notes that the reticence was caused by the U.S. legal
“culture of authority, in which the only question is whether the government
actor has jurisdiction.” 64 Some would argue proportionality was an approach
that was not even within the competence of the American judiciary, although
other common law courts had no comparable problem. 65 On this view,
proportionality was too policy-centered, even “activist”—a normative task
better left to the legislature. 66 Professor Michael Tonry suggests that these
attitudes were exacerbated by America’s fraught race relations: crime was
“racialized” in political campaigns, especially in the Republican party’s
Southern strategy to win over White voters. 67 No one, least of all the courts,
was about to second guess the decisions of the political branches, no matter how
biased. 68
Into the mix came the SRA and the Guidelines. The SRA introduced
appellate review of Guidelines sentencing, even substantive appellate review. 69
For appellate judges who had had no prior experience in sentencing and no
other framework by which to evaluate district court sentences—such as a
proportionality principle—the eight-hundred-plus-page Guidelines manual was
all there was. It was no surprise that for the first two decades of the Guidelines,
appellate review almost exclusively mandated compliance with the Guidelines

62. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3186
(2015) (examining Canadian cases in which the courts applied their “own judge-made rule of ‘gross
proportionality’” to all criminal punishments); see also Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, Sentence Appeals in
England: Promoting Consistent Sentencing Through Robust Appellate Review, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
81, 85 (2013) (“The English Court of Appeal—Criminal Division has a hundred-year-long history of
appellate-court development of sentencing principles through common-law review of sentencing
decisions.”).
63. See Marissa L. Marandola, Appellate Review of Sentences: Towards a Proportionality
Approach to Substantive Reasonableness Review 6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“In
the absence of substantive appellate review, no common law of sentencing developed in the United
States, even as other common law countries moved ahead with the project of introducing
proportionality review in their respective appellate bodies.”).
64. Vicki C. Jackson, Thayer, Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial Review, Factfinding and
Proportionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2367 (2017).
65. See Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy and Proportionality, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1585,
1585–86 (2012).
66. Professor Jackson describes this as “value skepticism” which leads to a “hesitation to deal headon with the relative importance of different constitutional values” in the judicial venue. Jackson, supra
note 64, at 2368, 2375.
67. Michael Tonry, Explanations of American Punishment Policies: A National History, 11
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 377, 386–89 (2009).
68. Id.
69. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2011–13
(1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742).
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and reversed judicial departures. 70 The result: While the appellate courts held
district court judges strictly accountable to the Guidelines, they did not hold
the Commission accountable to the language of the SRA or the general purposes
of sentencing, nor did they demand the Commission provide data for the
sentencing rules it promulgated. The appellate courts eschewed any kind of
meaningful review. 71
B.

After Booker

The Booker remedy required that appellate courts review sentences to
ensure that they are both substantively and procedurally “reasonable” with
regard to statutorily enumerated sentencing factors. 72 Procedural review was
easy; review of Guidelines computations was what the appellate courts had been
doing for decades. But substantive review raised new possibilities, a new way to
refresh and reconsider the flawed Guidelines framework. Even properly
computed Guidelines sentences could be “unreasonable.” (In fact,
“unreasonable” was the mild way to describe some properly computed
Guidelines sentences; more appropriate terms were unjust, unfair, and
disproportionate.) 73
70. See, e.g., Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches, supra note 42, at 137 (“Like the Commission, the
appellate courts fixated on Guideline enforcement. Most decisions were formulaic; few ever mentioned
sentencing purposes. The goal of departure review was to circumscribe it.”). Some courts were more
forgiving about Guidelines departures, even pre-Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d
597, 597 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991).
71. See Marandola, supra note 63, at 1.
72. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). Justice Breyer’s decision converted the
Guidelines to an advisory regime by excising two provisions of the SRA that made the Guidelines
binding: 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e). Id.
73. See Nancy Gertner, How To Talk About Sentencing Policy—and Not Disparity, 46 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 313, 323 (2014). I have written about one of the men I sentenced, Damien Perry. Id. at 320. He
was accused of distributing crack in small quantities on a street corner. For over a year, undercover
officers rode bicycles to buy crack from him and others on the block. Id. He had no weapon, and he
could not cooperate with the government because he did not know enough. Id. at 320–21. The
government wanted to “count” not only the drug distributions to which he pled guilty, but also other
instances for which they did not charge him. While he had no record, the government argued that he
should get over ten years—which was the Guidelines mandated sentence based on the drug quantity,
both charged and uncharged. Id. at 322. But the Guidelines did not account for the fact that Perry had
a bullet in his brain that could not be removed or that he was only twenty-one-years-old at the time of
the crime. Id. at 321, 323. There was no place on the grid for the fact that he did not know his mother
very well, she was seventeen when he was born, and she was addicted, a prostitute, and later jailed. Id.
at 321. He did not have any contact with his father until he was nearly ten. He was out of school by
the tenth or eleventh grade, with little or no support network. Id. The Guidelines sentence, even if
properly computed, was plainly unjust and substantively unreasonable by any measure in a rational
sentencing system. In another case, United States v. Wilkerson, 183 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Mass. 2002),
the defendant, a nonviolent street dealer, was convicted of distribution of crack cocaine. Id. at 373.
Wilkerson, homeless at fourteen-years-old, sold crack to buy school supplies for his siblings. Id. at 375.
The government wanted 140 to 175 months, increasing the mandatory minimum sentence of 120
months. Id. at 375–76. The mandatory sentence was triggered by a prior minor district court drug
offense. Id. I wrote: “The tragic bottom line is that for a non-violent street dealer for whom dealing
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Given the pre-Guidelines history of appellate review of sentencing
fairness—or, more accurately, the lack thereof—it was especially important for
the Supreme Court to provide guidance as to what “reasonableness” meant in
the context of “substantive review.” It did not. 74 In United States v. Rita, 75 in
which the Court affirmed a within-Guidelines sentence, the Court allowed but
did not require appellate courts to adopt a rebuttable presumption that a
sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable. 76 The presumption, the
Court emphasized, did not mean that appellate courts ought to give deference
to the Commission similar to that enjoyed by administrative agencies (or,
indeed, the deference that the Commission received prior to Booker). 77 That
disclaimer notwithstanding, Rita’s message was that following the Guidelines
still trumped all other approaches. Even in jurisdictions where the appellate
courts did not adopt a “presumption of reasonableness,” Rita provided a
continued justification for deference to the Guidelines. 78 According to Justice
Breyer, one of the Guidelines’ authors, deference was entirely appropriate
because the Guidelines reflected a “rough approximation of sentences that
might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” 79 While the Court also announced that
the standard of review would be a forgiving one—abuse of discretion 80—that
lenient standard hardly made a meaningful difference for judges’ computations
under the Guidelines. As I describe below, few judges were exercising their
discretion to critique the Guidelines at all.
Gall v. United States 81 was one of the first of Booker’s progeny, offering the
promise of articulating what the post-Booker world of sentencing would look
like. In Gall, the Court affirmed the sentence of a trial judge who had varied on
non-Guidelines grounds, 82 the kind of decision that would not have passed
muster pre-Booker. But the Court then proposed to structure post-Booker
appellate discretion in a way that substantially impacted the development of
non-Guidelines substantive sentencing theory. Under Gall, courts were obliged
to use a two-step process on appeal: First, appellate courts should review the
procedures used to impose the sentence, including failure to calculate or
improperly calculating the Guidelines range. 83 Then and only then, if there is
drugs, although wrong, may well have meant survival, Mr. Wilkerson will be obliged to serve ten years
in jail.” Id. at 376.
74. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Booker in the Circuits: Backlash or Balancing Act?, 6 HLRE: OFF
REC. 23, 31–33 (2015) [hereinafter Hessick, Booker in the Circuits].
75. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
76. See id. at 338–39.
77. See id. at 347, 351.
78. See id. at 350.
79. Id.
80. See Id. at 361 (Stevens, J., concurring).
81. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
82. See id. at 38–39.
83. Id. at 51.
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no procedural defect, the court should look to substantive reasonableness. 84
With respect to the latter step, the Supreme Court did not have much to say
except to consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any
variance from the Guidelines range.” 85
The emphasis on Guidelines computation, after a twenty-year tradition of
rigorous Guidelines enforcement, coupled with the absence of any tradition of
appellate review and the vagueness of the second prong—a variance in the light
of the general purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—had a predictable
result. Federal judges—both trial and appellate—knew how to do Guidelines
analysis; what they knew less about were the substantive standards for variance.
The Supreme Court did not help.
After Gall, and just as before, it was clear that a federal judge would be
reversed if they got the numbers wrong, no matter what else they did at the
second step. And just as before, if they did the computations correctly, virtually
any sentences conforming with the Guidelines would receive near-blanket
deference, often without reference to any reasons other than the existence of
the Guidelines themselves. 86 Appellate courts, after looking at the column of
figures that is Guidelines analysis, rarely say that a sentence is disproportionate
to the offense or the characteristics of the offender. 87 Appellate judges who
never did such substantive analysis pre-Guidelines, and did not have to do it in
the mandatory Guidelines regime, were unable or reluctant to engage in it postGall. The most important questions were still: “Did you calculate the
Guidelines accurately?” “Did you make any mistakes?” No one asked: “Did you
appropriately deal with the defendant’s addiction?” “Did you consider
alternatives to incarceration?”
84. Id.
85. Id. Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. 85 (2007), decided on the same day as Gall, affirmed
a trial judge who departed from the Guidelines based only on policy disagreements with the
Commission. See id. at 91. It seemed to expand the area for judicial discretion; the Court was willing
to tolerate “some departures from uniformity” as a “necessary cost of the remedy” to the constitutional
violation identified in Booker. Id. at 108. What “some departures from uniformity” meant was less than
clear.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Harry, 816 F.3d 1268, 1284 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen a district
court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the court must provide only a general statement of its
reasons, and need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a) factors or respond to every argument for
leniency that it rejects in arriving at a reasonable sentence.” (quoting United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d
1021, 1034 (10th Cir. 2011))); Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 155, 171 (2005) (concluding that the post-Booker Guidelines “remain as restrictive of judicial
sentencing discretion as any system in the United States”). Professor C. Hessick highlights how little
is asked of a within-Guidelines sentence in her description of the “brief, but legally sufficient,”
explanation provided by the lower court in Rita. Hessick, Booker in the Circuits, supra note 74, at 28–
29.
87. Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENV. U. L. REV.
27, 31–32 (2007) (“Data gathered by the NYCDL showed that, of 1,152 appeals of within-guideline
sentences in the post-Booker period, . . . only one . . . was because the sentence was found substantively
unreasonable.”).
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Guidelines Interpretation Stalls

As such, district court judges now have every incentive to adopt the most
conservative calculations possible under the Guidelines and to address any
resulting “unreasonable” sentences during a two-step variance. Interpretation
of the Guidelines, let alone critiques of the Guidelines, is nonexistent. Sadly,
even post-Booker, the Commission gets a pass for Guidelines that are vague,
inconsistent with the purposes of sentencing, not empirically justified, or
simply invented by the Commission without a reasonable explanation.
When I teach sentencing to judges, I ask, “Why didn’t you consider this
or that Guidelines enhancement? Did it not make sense, or was it ambiguous?”
They say, “Why bother?” and “Why risk reversal?” Rather than struggle with
the Guidelines that still frame sentencing, they would rather vary at the second
step in a space without any standards. 88 So, in the case of a drug addict charged
with a drug offense, it would be easier to accept the Guidelines’ admonition that
“drug or alcohol dependence or abuse is not a reason for a downward
departure,” 89 calculate the Guidelines sentence without that adjustment, and
then take addiction into account as one of the factors under § 3553(a).
The result of this standardless variance is the kind of murkiness in the
decisional law that one also sees in cases under § 1983. The Supreme Court in
Pearson provided the lower courts with the freedom to avoid the merits question
in civil rights cases—whether there was a violation of a constitutional right—
and go directly to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—
whether the constitutional right at issue was “clearly established.” 90 The result
of this merits avoidance was that constitutional rights were not clarified, and
the decisional law stalled. 91
While here, the trial court is obliged to decide the Guidelines
computation, but they are not required to delve too deeply. Whatever the
computation is—typically, the most rigid, discretion-limiting interpretation—
district court judges will accept it and save their concerns for the variance stage.
D.

Substantive Standards (Apart from the Guidelines) Fail To Develop

The variance standards (the § 3553(a) factors) likewise could not be any
vaguer. 92 Section 3553(a) is, in effect, just a catalogue of all the purposes of
sentencing, in no particular order and with no particular direction. This is an
“everything-you-wanted-to-consider-in-sentencing-but-were-afraid-to-ask”
list: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
88. See supra Part I (discussing the lack of coherent theory behind second-stage variance).
89. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
90. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 225 (2009).
91. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing this process in the context of
Pearson).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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characteristics of the defendant; 93 the need for the sentence imposed to “reflect
the seriousness of the offense,” 94 to effect deterrence, 95 to promote public
safety, 96 and to provide the defendant with needed services; 97 the need to avoid
sentencing disparity; 98 and the need to provide victims with restitution. 99 In
many jurisdictions, procedural review of variances is perfunctory: the district
court does not have to say much to justify a variance. 100 In others, the appellate
courts require at least some reasonable explanation. 101 And as to substantive
review, while Gall acknowledges its importance in the second prong on the twopart test, the Supreme Court did not expand on it beyond calling for judges to
look at the “totality of the circumstances.” 102 On the rare occasions when the
appellate courts do determine that an outside-the-Guidelines sentence is
unreasonable, the analysis is muddy. 103 For example, courts rarely lay down
principles that would help district court judges impose “reasonable” sentences
in future cases. 104 Some appellate courts—but not all—reflect the same hostility
to substantive review as we saw with respect to proportionality analysis, viewing
substantive review as “an invitation to mischief by tinkering with any sentence
that appellate judges simply do not like.” 105 Indeed, that may well be why some
93. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
94. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
95. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
96. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
97. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
98. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
99. Id. § 3553(a)(7).
100. In United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit indicated that a
detailed consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would double the work of a sentencing judge. Id. at 729.
The court reasoned that district courts required to consider the factors would continue to have to
compute the Guidelines sentence as before but would not also have to specifically address each of the
§ 3553(a) factors, which are “vague and, worse perhaps, hopelessly open-ended.” Id. Instead, the
Seventh Circuit required only an “adequate statement of the judge’s reasons”—whatever that means.
Id.
101. See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, De Facto Mandatory: A Quantitative Assessment of Reasonableness
Review After Booker, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 60 (2016). In describing the doctrinal uncertainty postBooker, Professor Carrie Leonetti noted, “Some circuits vest an inordinate amount of discretion at the
district court level, which is unreviewable in practice. At the other end of the spectrum, some circuits
vest much more discretion at the appellate level.” Id.
102. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
103. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 989–90 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that the
defendant’s criminal history and gang membership could not justify an above-Guidelines sentence
without “sufficient justifications” while also declining to give examples of such justifications for future
courts).
105. United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). In fact, while warning about
appellate courts going too far in “tinkering” with district court sentences, the panel outlined a standard
for substantive review quite similar to the standards in other common-law high courts:
The manifest-injustice, shocks-the-conscience, and substantive unreasonableness standards in
appellate review share several common factors. First, they are deferential to district courts and
provide relief only in the proverbial “rare case.” Second, they are highly contextual and do not
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courts conflate the requirements for substantive and procedural reasonableness;
American jurisprudence is far—far—more comfortable with procedural
review. 106
The result is a U.S. sentencing system that is neither fish nor fowl. It
provides neither a robust Administrative Procedure Act 107-like review of the
Guidelines, holding them up for critical analysis, nor is it a fulsome, substantive
sentencing theory based on proportionality, as one might find in other commonlaw countries. We have seen U.S. sentencing swing from indeterminate
sentencing in the 1980s, when a trial judge’s sentencing discretion was virtually
unlimited, to the opposite: the rigid Guidelines and mandatory minimum
system. And without a meaningful common law of sentencing independent of
the Guidelines to homogenize sentencing to some degree and create a core of
common principles, there is a risk that the Guidelines will continue to be the
default. 108 In that case, the Guidelines regime that will make its full-throated
return could well include incoherent sentencing definitions and standards which
should have been challenged long ago.
permit easy repetition in successive cases. Third, they are dependent on the informed intuition
of the appellate panel that applies these standards. In sum, these standards provide a backstop
for those few cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless damage the
administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low,
or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.
Id. For a critique of a comparable “manifestly excessive” or “manifestly inadequate” standard in
Australia, see Sarah Krasnostein & Arie Freiberg, Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic Sentencing
Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?, 76 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 274–75 (2013). But the difference between the Australian appellate courts and
the few U.S. appellate courts that have adopted a “manifestly excessive” or “manifest injustice”
standard is the expertise of the respective courts and the law they interpret. Australian appellate courts
have “an extensive sentencing jurisprudence, as well as principles to guide appellate intervention.” Id.
at 274. The “intuitions” of the court have been honed by appellate review of sentences over decades.
And Australian appellate courts are interpreting judge-made rules, which they can alter as the cases
require. They are not interpreting the contrived guidelines of a flawed Commission to whom too much
deference has already been paid.
106. See United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010), amended by 629 F.3d 793 (9th
Cir. 2010), vacated en banc, 679 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2012), which Professor Leonetti identified as “a
good example of how this confusion stemming from Booker and subsequent Supreme Court decisions
play out in practice.” Leonetti, supra note 101, at 58; see also Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 244
(2012) (holding against petitioner in part because he identified “no flaw in the District Court’s
decisionmaking process”); Tim Cone, Substantive Reasonableness Review of Federal Criminal Sentences: A
Proposed Standard, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 65, 72 (2012) (reflecting procedural and substantive confusion
by suggesting that substantive reasonableness was about the “soundness of the decision-making process
that led to a sentence” rather than the end result).
107. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
108. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
A Cure Worse than the Disease, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 104, 104 (2016) (acknowledging and responding
to Judge Pryor’s argument for a return to “a version of the pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines with strict
appellate review of Commission-controlled departures”).
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